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Northern Ireland: Devolution as an
Electoral Issue in the 2015 UK
General Election 
L’Irlande du Nord : la dévolution en tant qu’enjeu électoral lors des élections
législatives de 2015
Valérie Peyronel
By comparison with its counterparts, Scotland and Wales, devolution in Northern Ireland
is very particular. After 26 years of Direct Rule from 1972 to 1998, the Agreement1 (usually
better known as the Good Friday Agreement) was signed on April 10, 1998 after nearly a
decade of harsh negotiations including representatives of the unionist and nationalist
parties  in  Northern  Ireland2 as  well  as  representatives  of  the  British  and  Irish
governments3 and  external  mediators. 4 It  provided  Northern  Ireland  with  a  new
opportunity to make devolution work on the basis of a shared Northern Ireland Executive
and a  shared  Assembly  at  Stormont,  thus  guaranteeing  both  communities  and  their
political representatives equal representation in political debates. 
Operating devolution in this so-called post-conflict context has been difficult, complex,
and  the  deal  was  broken  several  times,5 causing  the  temporary  suspension  of  the
Northern Ireland institutions and compelling Downing Street and Westminster to take
over, as in the old troubled times. However, both the Northern Ireland Executive and
Stormont have now been functioning for eight years in a row, and a lot has been achieved
over the last 17 years, notably in terms of police and justice reform,6 urban renovation7
and  community  relations,8 north-south  economic  relations, 9 as  well  as  economic
modernisation (in particular attracting Foreign Direct Investment in innovative high-
technology sectors).10 
But  the  situation  still  remains  complicated  and  contentious.  Indeed  devolution  in
Northern Ireland has to do with much more than simply entrusting local representatives
with the power to decide on local matters, and the duty to develop a locally sustainable
political, social, economic and cultural system. In Northern Ireland, devolution requests
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the stakeholders, as well as the citizens, to abide by the very condition of showing their
capacity  to  live  and  work  peacefully  together,  despite  vitally  different  political
aspirations: remaining in the UK for the unionists, reuniting Ireland for the most extreme
nationalists. The 1998 Agreement states that the decision on whether Northern Ireland
should remain British or become Irish again lies  in the people of  Northern Ireland’s
hands: “The participants […] recognize the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a
majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue
to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland.”11 So far, no referendum
has been organised on this very hot issue, but the sword is hanging above Northern
Ireland’s political future. 
 
The Stormont House Agreement: Setting the Context
of the General Election Campaign
In the 2011-2015 period separating the two general election campaigns, the citizens of
Northern Ireland’s capacity to work together and smoothly operate devolution was put to
the hard test. First of all, the context of very slow economic recovery characterising the
aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis was very stressful, although, to some extent, the
recovery has been more marked in NI than in other parts of the UK. Acute disagreements
occurred on several issues, prompting David Cameron as well as his counterpart, Enda
Kenny, the President of the Republic of Ireland, to support Teresa Villiers, the Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland, in her attempt to bring multi-party negotiations in NI to a
favourable conclusion. In an interview on October 7, 2014, David Cameron disclaimed
accusations of being “detached” regarding Northern Ireland: “The point of devolution is for
the devolved institutions to deliver for the people of Northern Ireland”, requiring “people working
together to make compromises”.12
The bones of contention between the opposed parties referred to finance and welfare, to
institutional reform, to identity and cultural issues (among which flags and emblems),
and finally to dealing with the past and with victims.
Obviously,  the  multifaceted  scope  of  the  disagreements  (along  the  usual  unionist/
nationalist divide) reflected the intricacy of the devolution process in Northern Ireland,
where matters of cultural traditions and cultural conflict interfere with or matter just as
much  as  (if  not  more than)  more  general  and  national  stakes  such  as  nationwide
economic and welfare policies. But with the forthcoming general election in sight, it was
David Cameron’s interest not to stumble on a failed Northern Ireland devolution process,
and for the Northern Ireland party leaders to secure votes by defending their respective
voters’ interests on the above-mentioned issues. 
The Stormont House Agreement, which was signed on December 23, 2014, four days after
the official start of the General election campaign, tackled the four issues. Interestingly,
the  Agreement  document  starts  with  the  “Finance  and  Welfare”  issue,  then  “Flags,
identity, culture and tradition”, followed by “The past”. “Institutional reform” comes last.
More importantly, devolution and community relations issues are intertwined in each of
these four chapters. 
In the “Finance and welfare” chapter, the financial and economic arrangements of the
Agreement definitely point to more devolution. The Agreement advocates local
responsibility for a balanced budget and a reform of public services to improve quality
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and reduce administrative costs, but also, to compensate this austerity package, It also
recommends the development of flexibilities and top-ups from the block grant to better
address local needs. It underlines the need for the devolution of corporation tax as from
April 2017, and possibly some additional fiscal devolution for Northern Ireland including
aggregates Levy, Stamp Duty, Land Tax and Landfill Tax.
But  beside  tackling the budgetary and economic  aspects,  the text  also  mentions  the
appointment of an independent audit of departmental spending in charge of identifying
how divisions  in  society  impact  the  delivery  of  goods,  facilities  and services,  and of
considering  how best  to  reconfigure  service  delivery  in  a  manner  consistent  with  a
shared discrimination-free future. 
As far as “Flags, identity, culture and tradition” are concerned, the Agreement states that
the power to take responsibility for parades and related protests should, in principle, be
devolved to the NI Assembly. But it also plans the establishment of a Commission by June
2015 seeking to identify maximum consensus on their application of decisions regarding
flags and emblems as well as broader issues of identity, culture and tradition. 
To deal with “The past”, which is the third issue at stake, the Agreement guarantees local
empowerment thanks to the creation of an Oral History Archive by 2016 and the creation
of  a  Historical  Investigations  Unit  (HIU)  “to  take  forward investigations  into  outstanding
Troubles-related deaths”.13 The involvement of the UK Government is made clear by its
explicit commitment to full disclosure to the HIU. Finally, in order to better deal with
victims and survivors an Independent Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) is to be
appointed by both the British and Irish Governments. 
Finally the chapter on Institutional Reform provides for reforms to improve the operation
of devolution in Northern Ireland: reducing the number of Assembly members (5 per
constituency) by 2021; organising arrangements by March 2015 to enable “those parties
which would be entitled to ministerial positions in the Executive, but choose not to take them up, to
be recognised as an official opposition and measures to facilitate their work”;14 drawing up a
range  of  other  provisions  to  “promote  greater  efficiency  in  the  conduct  and  discharge  of
Executive business”;15 
Furthermore, the Agreement even states that 
The  UK  Government  also  stands  ready  to  consider  potential  further  areas  of
devolution  and  changes  to  intergovernmental  machinery  which  are  under
discussion elsewhere in the UK and likely to command broad support among parties
in Northern Ireland.16 
But the conditions under which these reforms can be implemented are clearly stated, and
all the parties must commit to keeping the post-conflict process up and alive. Indeed,
Article 69 in the Stormont House Agreement states that as no consensus has yet been
reached by the parties on a Bill of Rights, the latter have to commit to fostering a proper
context for a successful shared society:
serving the people of Northern Ireland equally and to act in accordance with the
obligations  on  government  to  promote  equality  and  respect  and  to  prevent
discrimination;  to  promote  a  culture  of  tolerance,  mutual  respect  and  mutual
understanding  at  every  level  of  society,  including  initiatives  to  facilitate  and
encourage shared and integrated education and housing, social inclusion, and in
particular community development and the advancement of women in public life;
and  to  promote  the  interests  of  the  whole  community  towards  the  goals  of
reconciliation and economic renewal.17 
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Furthermore article 72 lays an obligation upon the shared Northern Ireland Executive to
“commit  to  a  continuing effort  to  eradicate  sectarianism in  all  forms”18 and the reviewing
process includes the Northern Ireland Executive party leaders as well as the UK and Irish
governments (article 72) reflecting the three-stand approach. 
Martin Mc Guinness, of Sinn Féin, and Northern Ireland’s current Deputy First Minister
said that the deal could give the Northern Ireland Executive a “fresh start”, qualifying
this optimistic statement by admitting that it was yet incomplete: “Of course every one of us
would have liked to have had a more comprehensive and complete agreement but this is as much
and more than we have ever been able to do on these issues in the past.”19 DUP leader Peter
Robinson, the current First Minister of Northern Ireland, also declared that the deal was
an  achievement.  However,  the  SDLP,  who  finally  did  sign  the  agreement,  did  so
reluctantly after having warned that “the outcome [was] not comprehensive or decisive across
all  issues”.20 Alliance leader,  David Ford,  declared that  the Agreement  “ fell  short”21 of
expectations  and  the  UUP  expressed  that  the  proposals  included  “many  aspects  of
uncertainty”.22 
 
Electoral Stakes in Northern Ireland
Such was  the  devolution context  in  which the  2015  Westminster  electoral  campaign
started: devolution  indeed,  but  devolution  under  the  tight  control  of  the  British
government and the Conservative current  political  agenda;  an austerity package and
budget control as a pre-requisite to the devolution of corporation tax (and possibly even
more  fiscal  devolution  in  the  longer  term);  the  obligation  to  keep  dealing  with
community  relations  and  post-conflict  issues  as  a  cornerstone  and  continuous
prerequisite for devolution and, finally, what sounded like an unusually more consensual
political climate in Northern Ireland. 
But  beyond the apparent  consensus,  there was a  general  election to be run and the
question was for the parties to orchestrate their campaign so as to simultaneously gather
the support of their voters for the Westminster election and make Northern Ireland’s
voice heard next to Wales and Scotland while paving the way for the forthcoming local
elections due to take place in Northern Ireland in 2016. 
In an article published on April 1, 2015, a little more than one month before the election,
Professor John D. Brewer, a specialist of post-conflict politics at Queen’s University in
Belfast, underlined the “parochialism” of the political debates in Northern Ireland, even in
the frame of a general election: 
The issues that will dominate political discourse in Britain in the coming weeks will
be largely absent in Northern Ireland. There will be silence over Europe and the
referendum. Immigration will hardly feature, nor even will austerity, or cheating
on tax or benefits. The legacy issues from Northern Ireland’s conflict will dominate
as a surrogate for political contestation over the morality of the war, the morality
of the settlement, and the morality of dealing with the past.23
Indeed in Northern Ireland, local and general elections are closely related, in so far as the
scores  reached by  each of  the  communities’  political  representatives  in  any election
(local, national or even European) is a contribution to the inner fight for power within
Northern Ireland, even in spite of the devolved power-sharing structure which is meant
to guarantee equal representation of the unionist and the nationalist sides. John Brewster
describes  a  continuous  process  of  “sectarian  politics”  which  the  terms  of  the  1998
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Agreement have not infringed (or very little so). Of course, sectarianism is particularly
vividly expressed in the occasion of local elections, as the stakes are more directly related
to locally contentious issues and every seat in the power-sharing assembly must be won
so as to win over the other community: 
The main electoral battles are not between the two main governing parties, Sinn
Féin (SF) on the Nationalist side and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) on the
Unionist  side.  In  devolved elections,  they compete to  become the single  largest
party, thereby winning the right to choose the First Minister; Rather than being
between the two parties,  the outcome is  determined by their  ability to win the
sectarian vote within their “tribe”.24
But  considering  the  very  small  number  of  seats  for  the  Northern  Ireland  MPs  in
Westminster,25 the general  election and,  even more so,  the European elections,  are a
smaller  incentive to cut-throat  competition for  votes among the parties  in Northern
Ireland. Whatever their position, Northern Ireland’s representatives’ voices cannot make
a difference in the national debate, unless they partner up with representatives of the
major parties. One piece of evidence of the little influence Northern Ireland MPs may
have on Westminster debates is the fact that Sinn Féin, usually a very fiery party, does
not  even  take  its  seats  in  Westminster.  Officially  their  attitude  is  dictated  by  their
symbolic refusal to take seats in a British Parliament. But should there be any means for
them to have the final say in the debates their position might be quite different 
In the 2015 general election campaign, however, there were two motives for a stronger
interest by the parties of Northern Ireland. Indeed, when a general election takes place
little before the local elections, as was the case with the forthcoming local elections due
to take place in 2016, it serves as a test for each party’s potential and for their electoral
support. As John Brewster put it: “What matters in the race is primarily prestige within the
landscape of the identity politics back home.”26 Another important incentive to win seats in
Westminster this time was the perspective of a possibly hung Parliament with neither of
the two main parties,  Labour or the Conservatives, being able to win a majority. The
interest of the larger parties in Northern Ireland (like their counterparts’ in Scotland and
Wales) was spurred by the possibility of being offered an unusual opportunity to have
more  influence  in  Westminster,  to  voice  their  concerns  about  any  matter  regarding
Northern Ireland, directly or indirectly. 
 
Devolution and the UK in the Manifestos
How were the issues that had been addressed in the Stormont House Agreement to make
the devolution “work better” used and debated during the General Election campaign?
And  to  what  extent  were  local  and  national  concerns  intertwined?  In  spite  of  the
consensus reached in the Stormont House Agreement,  the basic line of the unionist/
nationalist divide did not shift during the campaign and the general election campaign
also very much staged local concerns. 
As for the institutional framework, on the unionist side, the UUP and the DUP manifestos
took a very clear stand in favour of devolution and the necessary unity of the Kingdom.
The UUP campaign was particularly pro devolution and pro UK: “A stable Union is the most
important result a good unionist should hope for in his Election….While our MPs will seek to do the
best they can for the people of NI, we will also work in the best interests of the UK as a whole.”27
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But  the  DUP,  while  not  questioning  the  devolution,  expressed  firmer  views  on  the
responsibilities of Westminster, expected, on the one hand, to guarantee the institutional
framework  necessary  for  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  devolved  power-sharing
structure in Northern Ireland, and, on the other hand, to remain supportive: “ For us to
deliver the kind of changes and improvements that we want to see, we will need the support of
Westminster  to  make  sure  that  politics  operates  better  in  Northern  Ireland.  This  includes  a
guaranteed seat  in  the  Cabinet  and an agreed minimum level  of  representation for  Northern
Ireland in the House of Commons.”28
At the other end of the political spectrum, Republican Sinn Féin, while having supported
the  Stormont  House  Agreement  and praised this new chance  given to  devolution in
Northern Ireland, reaffirmed in their general election manifesto “the right to a Referendum
on Irish unity [as] one of several outstanding issues within the Good Friday Agreement and other
agreements which the British Government [needed] to  act upon”, even “[calling] for the Irish
Government to plan for Irish unity”.29 Obviously, as the only party in Northern Ireland, in the
UK and in the Republic of Ireland holding a North-South national Irish position, Sinn
Féin’s stand is very singular, and its participation both in the local elections in Northern
Ireland and in the British election is also meant to enlarge its electoral basis as an all-
party Ireland.  So while  firmly participating in the positive outcome of  the Stormont
House Agreement so as not to be side-lined in the power-sharing dynamics in Northern
Ireland,  Sinn  Féin  also  had  to  make  their  nationalist  position  very  clear  in  their
manifesto. 
The SDLP’s position was more ambiguous, as the party supported more devolution to
Northern Ireland (among other fields in broadcasting, national insurance and minimum
wage, energy and mineral resources), but as a means to pave the way for a united Ireland,
advocated as a final outcome by a party who, although not as radically positioned as Sinn
Féin, would not betray its nationalist obedience: “In a united Ireland, we see the continuation
of a Stormont Assembly and we see the same rights and protections that the SDLP delivered as part
of the GFA”.30 
The  Alliance  Party,  quoting  the  Scottish  referendum  experience,  and  faithful  to  its
median position, advocated a “move towards a federal UK”, with “additional powers conferred
on the devolved administrations.”31 
As far as economic and welfare issues are concerned, all parties presented the economic
recovery  and  development  of  Northern  Ireland,  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  the
development of the private sector, as an absolute priority, and in line with the Stormont
House Agreement, they all pleaded for fiscal devolution. 
The UUP manifesto was very precise, claiming that the devolution of corporation tax was
an essential means to make Northern Ireland less dependent on the block grant, insisting
that Northern Ireland had “paid [its] way” when Northern Ireland was a “major economic
powerhouse”, and that it was time, after years of dependency on British subsidies, to “shift from
dependency to wealth generation”.32 In particular, the devolution of corporation tax would
enable Northern Ireland to compete against the record 12.5% Foreign Direct Investment
attractive corporation tax rate in the Republic  and would “represent a 7.5% positive
differential with Great Britain”.33 While nationalist Sinn Féin also shed the light on the
comparison  between  the Republic  and  Northern  Ireland,  the  focus  was  laid  on  the
potential reunification of the island with a usual Sinn Féin national all-island scope: “The 
potential of our island economy is strong. Harmonising tax regimes […] is central to creating a fully
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integrated and healthy economy […] and creating a better business climate for advancement of
entrepreneurial spirit north and south.”34 
The DUP’s  and the SDLP’s  approaches  on tax issues  were broader,  the unionist  DUP
advocating a “UK wide tax policy improvements  to  encourage economic growth in Northern
Ireland”35 while the nationalist SDLP pleaded for more fiscal independence to generate
more wealth: “A Scottish-style commission to begin the devolution of further powers which will
allow us  to  take  control  of  additional  fiscal  levers”.36 The Alliance Party manifesto,  while
advocating more fiscal transparency and fairness and a better administration of tax, was
silent on the issue of the devolution of corporation tax, thus not opposing it. 
But  tax  devolution  is  just  as  far  as  the consensus  went  in  the  manifestos.  Indeed,
divergences  clearly  appeared  on  economic  and  welfare  issues  during  the  campaign.
However, quite interestingly, the traditional unionist/nationalist divide was superseded
by what sounded more like a right wing/left wing one, the parties taking different stands
on the British Government’s austerity programme and its impact on devolved Northern
Ireland.  The  UUP  somewhat  stood  out,  advocating  very  liberal  economic  strategies,
supporting cost-saving reforms in the public sector and encouraging the development of
the private sector as a means to boost long-term economic recovery: “switching from a
culture of Dependency on welfare and the Block Grant to a mind-set where we are focused on
generating serious  wealth for  all  our  people” to bridge the huge prosperity gap between
Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK”.37
While the DUP also supported the idea of “sustained growth in the private sector”,38 it joined
Sinn Féin and the SDLP in opposing any further budget cuts and a reform of the public
services that would be detrimental to the people of Northern Ireland. The title of Sinn
Féin’s manifesto was unequivocal in this regard: “Equality not Austerity”, as was the SDLP’s:
“Prosperity, not Austerity”. 
The third major theme tackled in the Stormont House Agreement, “Dealing with post-
conflict  issues” was more consensual  during the electoral  campaign.  In line with the
Stormont  House  Agreement,  three  parties  made  convergent  proposals  (although  not
completely similar) to address post conflict issues, as part of the implementation of the
Good Friday Agreement and of the devolution process: “Building a society that welcomes
diversity”39 in the UUP’s manifesto, “uniting communities and tackling sectarianism”40 in Sinn
Féin’s, “continuing sustained lobbying for a strong Bill of Rights”41 in the SDLP’s. The Alliance
party was most explicit about the role played by local institutions in building a more
peaceful society in Northern Ireland: “Most of the mechanisms for delivering a shared future
for Northern Ireland such as the powers to integrate education and build shared communities are
devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly. However Westminster has an important role to play in
ensuring that a shared future and good relations are central to Northern Ireland’s work.” 42 
In  contrast,  though,  the  stand taken by  the  unionist  DUP in  its  manifesto  was  very
minimal.  In  the manifesto  introduction,  Peter  Robinson wrote  “We want  to  create  a
shared and united Northern Ireland”43 but the remaining part of the sentence presented
this unity as a prerequisite for economic prosperity and not as a full-fledge objective.
Chapter  4  of  the  manifesto,  entitled  “Traditions  and  identity”,  proposed  various
programmes meant to reinforce the cohesion between Northern Ireland and other parts
of  the  UK,  but  there  was  no  mention at  all  of  any  means  to  settle  intercommunity
disputes or reinforce cohesion within Northern Ireland. 
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The General election Results in Northern Ireland
The results of the election confirmed the predominance of unionist vote in Northern
Ireland, both in terms of vote share and in terms of seats. 
 2010 2015
Parties Seats Vote share Seats Vote share
DUP 8 25% 8 25.7%
UUP 0 15.2% 2 16%
Sinn Féin 5 25.5 % 4 24.5%
SDLP 2 16.5 % 2 13.9%
Alliance 1 6.3 % 0 8.6%
Source: table adapted by the author from The Electoral Commission UK, http://
www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-
elections-and-referendums/uk-general-elections, accessed June 9, 2015.
With a total of 41.7% of vote share and 10 seats, the unionists took the lead over the
nationalists with only 38.4% of vote share and 6 seats. Compared with 2010, the unionists
won 1.7% in the vote share but the first-past-the-post system enabled them to win two
seats,  while  the nationalists  lost  3.6% in vote share and lost  one seat.  The unionists
managed to win one seat from nationalist Sinn Féin and one from the moderate Alliance
Party. This success was the result of a coalition campaign between the DUP and the UUP,
spurred by  the  common defence  of  the  Union,  as  well  as,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the
perspective of a better representation of unionist Ireland in a no-majority Westminster
and, on the other hand, by the failure, for the UUP, of the 2010 UUP-Labour alliance. As
unionist politician Simon Hamilton declared: “I  think the big message coming out of  this
election is that it’s a great result for unionism”.44
Analysts  also  explain  Sinn  Féin’s  declining  vote  share  by  the  fact  that  the  party’s
campaign was very much based on putting an end to austerity, while, as one of the two
major parties operating the Northern Ireland shared Executive and Stormont, they had
been  part  of  the  implementation  of  the  austerity  package  imposed  by  the  British
Government  and by  Westminster.  According  to  analyst  Jordan Shilton,  Sinn Féin’s  “
posture as a left alternative to the austerity measures that have been implemented throughout
Britain since 2008, including in Northern Ireland, is increasingly being discredited”.45 
But the major loser in the 2015 general election in Northern Ireland, as both the result of
the DUP-UUP coalition and the first-past-the-post system, was the Alliance Party: despite
the fact that they scored better in vote share in 2015 than they had done in 2010 (8.6% in
2015 compared with 6.3% in 2010), they lost their only seat46 in Westminster. However,
the fact that their vote share was the highest since 1992 is evidence that among their
traditionally more moderate middle-class electorate, Alliance keep gaining momentum
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and the forthcoming 2016 elections might tell a slightly different story from the 2015
General election one. 
 
Conclusion
In spite of a more favourable and apparently more consensual political context fostered
by the recently signed Stormont House Agreement, the 2015 General election campaign in
Northern Ireland once again illustrated the divergences between the parties regarding a
large range of issues relating to the functioning of the devolved institutions. The basic
unionist/nationalist divide, however, was blurred on some issues to the benefit of a more
traditional  liberalism  vs  welfare  debate.  However,  devolution  as  such  has  not  been
questioned, and the unionist victory has made no difference in that regard. Some issues
like the devolution of corporation tax have even gathered the support of all the parties
involved.  However,  with  the  forthcoming  2016  local  elections  in  sight,  it  will  be
interesting to observe, on the one hand, how the five major parties capitalise on the 2015
General election results (and, in particular, what the Alliance party’s results will be) and,
on the other hand, whether, in the meantime, the Northern Ireland shared Executive will
manage to implement the Stormont House Agreement which is meant to support a better
and more consensual devolution system in Northern Ireland. 
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ABSTRACTS
The 2015 General Election in Northern Ireland was set in the particular context of the Stormont
House Agreement,  which was reached on December 23,  2014,  in a  renewed attempt to make
devolution in Northern Ireland, as defined in the 1998 “Good Friday” Agreement, operate more
smoothly. On top of tackling the inescapable issues of finance and welfare in a still sluggish post-
financial  crisis  economic  context,  the  Stormont  House  Agreement  indeed  addressed  several
dividing  issues,  such  as  flags,  identity,  culture  and  tradition,  dealing  with  the  past  and
institutional reform. This article analyzes the stands taken during the electoral campaign by the
five main parties in Northern Ireland (the Democratic Unionist Party, the Ulster Unionist Party,
the Social and Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin and the Alliance Party) on the various
issues raised in the Stormont House Agreement, underlining their convergences and divergences.
It also briefly looks at the results and challenges ahead, in the particular context of the so called
“post-conflict” Northern Ireland. 
Les élections législatives de 2015 en Irlande du Nord se sont tenues peu après qu’ait été conclu, le
23  décembre  2014,  l’Accord  de  Stormont  House,  une  nouvelle  tentative  destinée  à  faire
fonctionner  la  dévolution  en  Irlande  du  Nord,  telle  que  définie  par  l’Accord  de  1998  dit  du
« Vendredi Saint », de manière plus efficace. En sus des sujets de politique financière et sociale
inévitables  dans  un  contexte  économique  post-crise  financière  encore  morose,  l’Accord  de
Stormont House aborde en effet plusieurs sujets controversés comme les drapeaux, l’identité, la
culture et la tradition, la gestion du passé et les réformes institutionnelles. Cet article analyse la
position  des  cinq  principaux  partis  d’Irlande  du  Nord  pendant  la  campagne  ((le  Democratic
Unionist Party, le Ulster Unionist Party, le Social and Democratic and Labour Party, Sinn Féin and
l’Alliance Party) sur les différents thèmes inclus dans l’Accord de Stormont House, en soulignant
les points de convergence et de divergence. Il examine également brièvement les résultats ainsi
que les défis à venir, dans le contexte particulier de ce que l’on appelle l’Irlande du Nord de
l’après-conflit. 
INDEX
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post-conflict
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